منابع مشابه
Copeland voting: ties matter
We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter α that describes how ties in head-to-head contests are valued. We show that the thus obtained problem of manipulation for unweighted Copeland elections is NP-complete even if the size of the manipulating coalition is limited to two. Our result holds for all rational ...
متن کاملProbabilistic Copeland Tournaments
INTRODUCTION We consider a probabilistic model of round-robin tournaments, or equivalently, Copeland voting, where candidates are the voters. We assume that the outcomes of each game or pairwise vote are jointly independent. In particular, we do not assume that votes arise from voters’ ranked orderings of candidates. We can treat such games as pairwise preferences, without assuming any form of ...
متن کاملCopeland Dueling Bandits
A version of the dueling bandit problem is addressed in which a Condorcet winner may not exist. Two algorithms are proposed that instead seek to minimize regret with respect to the Copeland winner, which, unlike the Condorcet winner, is guaranteed to exist. The first, Copeland Confidence Bound (CCB), is designed for small numbers of arms, while the second, Scalable Copeland Bandits (SCB), works...
متن کاملAmerican Pediatric Society 2007 John Howland Award recipient. Dr. Ralph Feigin.
Dr. Ralph Feigin was born in New York City on April 3, 1938. He received his A.B. degree from Columbia College in New York City in 1958 and his M.D. degree from Boston University School of Medicine in 1962. He completed a Pediatric Internship at the Boston City Hospital from 1962–63 and served as a Pediatric Resident at the Boston City Hospital from 1963–64 and at the Massachusetts General Hosp...
متن کاملManipulation of copeland elections
We resolve an open problem regarding the complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation, namely, the complexity of Copeland-manipulation for α ∈ {0, 1}. Copeland, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is an election system where for each pair of candidates we check which one is preferred by more voters (i.e., we conduct a head-to-head majority contest) and we give one point to this candidate and zero to the other. How...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 1905
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/073032b0