Double preference relations for generalised belief change
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Double preference relations for generalised belief change
Many belief change formalisms employ plausibility orderings over the set of possible worlds to determine how the beliefs of an agent ought to be modified after the receipt of a new epistemic input. While most such possible world semantics rely on a single ordering, we investigate the use of an additional preference ordering—representing, for instance, the epistemic context the agent finds itsel...
متن کاملFrom Belief Change to Preference Change
Various tasks need to consider preferences in a dynamic way. We start by discussing several possible meanings of preference change, and then focus on the one we think is the most natural: preferences evolving after some new fact has been learned. We define a family of such preference change operators, parameterized by a revision function on epistemic states and a semantics for interpreting pref...
متن کاملMulti-Criteria Decision Making Method with Belief Preference Relations
In modeling Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problem, we usually assume that the decision maker is able to elicitate his preferences with precision and without difficulty. However, in many situations, the expert is unable to provide his assessment with certainty or he is unwilling to quantify his preferences. To deal with such situations, a new MCDM model under uncertainty is introduced. I...
متن کاملGames with Communication: From Belief to Preference Change
In this work we consider simple extensive-form games with two players, Player A and Player B, where Player B can make announcements about his strategy. Player A has then to revise her preferences about her strategies, so as to better respond to the strategy she believes Player B will play. We propose a generic framework that combines methods and techniques from belief revision theory and social...
متن کاملYet More Modal Logics of Preference Change and Belief Revision
We contrast Bonanno’s ‘Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework’ [15] with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of communication and change of [11] with relational substitutions [8] for preference change, and show that this does not alter its properties. Next we move to a more constrained context where belief a...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.001