Double Bertrand tax competition: a fiscal game with governments acting as middlemen
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Double Bertrand tax competition: a fiscal game with governments acting as middlemen
In a common market with costless mobility of all factors, regional governments can attract mobile rms by granting subsidies which must be nanced out of wage taxes on mobile labour. Since rms locate where subsidies are highest and workers settle where taxes are lowest, government are forced "in the splits" (double Bertrand-type tax competition). We assume that without government intervention the...
متن کاملEndogenizing governments' objectives in tax competition
a r t i c l e i n f o In this paper we endogenize objective functions of the regions in case the of tax competition for foreign owned mobile capital. First, considering symmetric regions and simultaneous move tax competition, we demonstrate that the competing regions can restrict 'race-to-the-bottom' in tax rates by deviating away from social welfare to net tax revenue. Moreover, it is optimal ...
متن کاملAgglomeration , tax competition , and fiscal equalization
This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal equalization on asymmetric tax competition when positive agglomeration externalities are present. It shows that equalization of standardized tax revenue improves the spatial allocation of capital provided that agglomeration externalities are sufficiently strong. JEL Classification: R12, H71, H73.
متن کاملTax Competition and Fiscal Federalism in Italy
The opinions expressed here do not involve any of the above organizations.
متن کاملAsymmetric tax competition and fiscal equalization in a repeated game setting
Article history: Received 29 July 2014 Received in revised form 3 October 2015 Accepted 5 October 2015 Available online 22 October 2015 This paper examines the relationship between tax competition and fiscal equalization in a standard tax competition model with repeated actions, in which regions differ in per capita capital endowments and production technologies. In particular, it asks how a fi...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Regional Science and Urban Economics
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0166-0462
DOI: 10.1016/s0166-0462(00)00061-2