Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations

Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations

A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for every individual i and every choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i’s allocation graph have nonnegative length for every integer k ≥ 2. Saks and Yu (Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’05), 2005, 286–293) have shown that ...

Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation

Though some economic environments provide allocation rules that are implementable in dominant strategies (strategy-proof), a significant number of environments yield impossibility results. On the other hand, while there are quite general possibility results regarding implementation in Nash or Bayesian equilibrium, these equilibrium concepts make strong assumptions about the knowledge that playe...

Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

Upper semicontinuous valuations on the space of convex discs

We show that every rigid motion invariant and upper semicontinuous valuation on the space of convex discs is a linear combination of the Euler characteristic, the length, the area, and a suitable curvature integral of the convex disc. 1991 AMS subject classification: 52A10, 53A04

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement e¢ cient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type a¤ects other agents’utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with CGV payments. We show that when agents are informationally sma...