Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules’ range. We show that when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range must contain t...
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We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Our main result is the characterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-pr...
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This paper studies the design of a strategy-proof resource allocation rule in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. It is known that the uniform rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, and anonymity if the number of commodity is only one and preferences are single-peaked (Sprumont (1991)). However, if ...
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In this paper, we study a resource allocation problem of economies with many commodities and single-peaked preferences. It is known that the uniform rule is the unique allocation mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and anonymity, if the number of good is only one and pereferences are single-peaked. (Sprumont [7].) However, if the number of goods is greater than one, the s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0624-4