Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution
We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to φ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact φ is a way for them to φ. These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to φ just is knowing that some w is a way for on...
متن کاملDoing Without Believing Skill, Intellectualism, and Knowledge-How
The debate between Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists on the nature of ‘knowledge-how’ has thus far centered on arguments from the syntax or semantics of natural languages, surveys of folk judgments, and appeals to intuitions about hypothetical cases. We propose a new approach, focusing on real-world cases found in the empirical psychology literature. Our argument is simple: while the h...
متن کاملBelieving Change and Changing Belief
We present a rst order logic of time chance and probability that is capable of expressing the relation between subjective probability and objective chance at di erent times Us ing this capability we show how the logic can distinguish between causal and evidential correlation by distinguishing between condi tions events and actions that in uence the agent s belief in chance and the agent believe...
متن کامل«In-Between Believing» and Degrees of Belief
Schwitzgebel (2001) —henceforth «S»— offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in «in-between states of belief». He then argues that there are no «Bayesian» or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I...
متن کاملBelief attribution despite verbal interference.
False-belief (FB) tasks have been widely used to study the ability of individuals to represent the content of their conspecifics' mental states (theory of mind). However, the cognitive processes involved are still poorly understood, and it remains particularly debated whether language and inner speech are necessary for the attribution of beliefs to other agents. We present a completely nonverba...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0888-9