منابع مشابه
Does Trade Foster Contract Enforcement?
Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in c...
متن کاملTrade and Contract Enforcement
We develop a simple model of trade with imperfect contract enforcement. Courts force the execution of defaulted contracts with parametric probability. In political economic equilibrium, the enforcement of contracts between agents of sovereign nations must be at a level mutually agreed between nations. The enforcement probability may be low, with the reluctant nation being associated with low le...
متن کاملDoes Weak Contract Enforcement Impede R&D Alliance Formation?
This paper investigates whether the effectiveness of contract enforcement affects the extent for firms to form R&D alliances. We first formalize in a model how weak contract enforcement is associated with a lower probability of observing a firm forming any R&D alliance. The model implies that such an association is further exacerbated if the firm perceives its partner as less trustworthy. Using...
متن کاملInstitutions and Contract Enforcement
We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions dismissal barriers, and bonus pay a ect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative e ect on worker performance, by interfering with rms' use of ring threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of...
متن کاملContract Enforcement and Firms’ Financing
This paper studies how the degree of contract enforcement in a country influences firms’ financing decisions. We first document empirical facts on debt financing for two new firm-level datasets in the United Kingdom and Ecuador. In the United Kingdom, small firms borrow more relative to their assets than large firms, whereas in Ecuador small firms borrow less. We build a dynamic model of firms’...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0378-0