Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.048