Does shareholder litigation affect the corporate information environment?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in United States, we show that reduction shareholder litigation risk deteriorates firms’ stock price informativeness. This informativeness is due to firms changing way they invest rather than obfuscating or withholding firm-specific information. We also associated with higher investment-price sensitivity. Overall, despite causing a deterioration information environment, does not appear harm wealth. Our paper offers novel insights into net economic benefits laws.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Markets
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1386-4181', '1878-576X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2020.100600