Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Does ought imply can?
Most philosophers believe that a person can have an obligation only insofar as she is able to fulfil it, a principle generally referred to as "Ought Implies Can". Arguably, this principle reflects something basic about the ordinary concept of obligation. However, in a paper published recently in this journal, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri presented evidence for the conclusion that ordinary p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Utilitas
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0953-8208,1741-6183
DOI: 10.1017/s0953820803001055