Does observability amplify sensitivity to moral frames? Evaluating a reputation-based account of moral preferences

Moral Hazard and Observability

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Moral preferences

How do humans or machines make a decision? Whenever we make a decision, we consider our preferences over the possible options. Also, in a social context, collective decisions are made by aggregating the preferences of the individuals. AI systems that support individual and collective decision making have been studied for a long time, and several preference modelling and reasoning frameworks hav...

Moral Preferences

In this brief response to Etzioni's paper we argue that satisfying one's preferences and seeking to live up to one's moral standards are not incompatible ways of living one's life, and that choosing to act morally need not involve self-sacrifice.

Aggregating Moral Preferences

Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. ‘Idealadvisor’ accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the adviso...

Moral Sensitivity as a Precondition of Moral Distress.