Does local governments’ budget deficit push up housing prices in China?

Does local governments’ budget deficit push up housing prices in China?

Article history: Received 4 March 2014 Received in revised form 12 August 2014 Accepted 12 August 2014 Available online 23 August 2014 Budget deficit has been a commonfiscal pressure facing Chinese cities since the 1994fiscal reform. Meanwhile, land lease sales have become a significant off-budgetary revenue to local governments since 2003. This paper investigateswhetherfinancing budget deficit...

Soft-Budget Constraint on Local Governments in China

The Federal Push to Bring Computer Applications to Local Governments

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The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China

a salient organizational phenomenon in the Chinese bureaucracy is collusion among local governments in response to policies and directives from higher authorities; local governments often form alliances to compromise the original intention behind state policies. There are thus significant and persistent deviations and goal displacement in policy implementation. This article develops an organiza...

State Misallocation and Housing Prices: Theory and Evidence from China

This paper examines the equilibrium price effects of the privatization of housing assets that were previously owned and allocated by the state. I develop a theoretical framework that shows that privatization can have ambiguous effects on prices in the private market, and that the degree of misallocation of the assets prior to privatization determines the subsequent price effects. I test the pre...