Does Litigation Deter or Encourage Real Earnings Management?
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Accounting Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1558-7967,0001-4826
DOI: 10.2308/accr-52589