Does Group Identity Prevent Inefficient Investment in Outside Options? An Experimental Investigation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY CHRISTCHURCH, NEW ZEALAND Does Group Identity Prevent Inefficient Investment in Outside Options? An Experimental Investigation
We study whether group identity helps mitigate inefficiencies associated with appropriable quasi-rents, which are often created by relationship-specific investments in bilateral trade relationships. Based on previous findings that group identity strengthens other-regarding preferences, we conjecture that group identity reduces agents' incentives to undertake ex-post opportunistic behavior such ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2540070