Does electoral violence affect vote choice and willingness to vote? Conjoint analysis of a vignette experiment

The Calculus of Vote-Selling: Electoral Trust and the Value of a Vote

Existing work has established that clientelistic parties can maximize their returns by targeting poor voters, because their votes are “cheaper” in the sense that the value of a gift is elastic and the diminishing marginal utility of income implies that a gift of a given monetary value will be worth more to a poorer voter. I examine the The Calculus of Vote-Selling: Electoral Trust and the Value...

Electoral Design: One Man, One Vote Bid

We compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice, e.g. adopt one of two proposals. We show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred, simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome. The fraction of the surplus lost rises with the number of voters and the total surplus loss diverges in the limit when the number of voters grows large. We introduce a simple bi...

Electoral Engineering: One Man, One Vote Bid

We compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice, e.g. adopt one of two proposals. We show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred, simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome. The fraction of the surplus lost rises with the number of voters and the total surplus loss diverges in the limit when the number of voters grows large. We introduce a simple bi...

To vote or not to vote?

 Students will recognize the importance of voting within a democracy.  Students will conduct a survey of voters in the community.  Students will analyze results of the survey.  Students will suggest ways to increase voter participation.  Students will list steps in registering to vote.  Students will identify various ways to register to vote (local registration, on the Web, through the de...

Vote Early, Vote Often