Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?
When politicians negotiate in international climate conventions they may suffer from incomplete information about each other’s preferences about reaching an agreement. As is known, this may cause failure to reach an efficient cooperative agreement. We study the role of the clean development mechanism (CDM) for the likelihood of such failure. The CDM has been introduced in the context of the Kyo...
متن کاملClean Development Mechanism
1. At its sixty-ninth meeting, the Executive Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) of the clean development mechanism (CDM) considered the draft " Guidelines for determination of baseline and additionality thresholds for standardized baselines using the performance-penetration approach " (the guidelines) prepared by the secretariat. The Board provided comments and requested the secretari...
متن کاملClean Development meChanism
INtrODuCtION The Clean Development Mechanism has been recognized as a force for the empowerment of women through its various methodologies. While these methodologies may not have started out to be gender-friendly per se, their application has improved women's lives and by extension the lives of their communities. This publication will highlight some of these gender-friendly methodologies, as we...
متن کاملInternational Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems
We study coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an IEA for environmental issues in the Coalitional Bargaining Game (CBG) of Gomes (2005, Econometrica). For the general CBG, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for immediate formation of the grand coalition. We apply the CBG to a river sharing problem with two symmetric upstream agents and one downstream agent....
متن کاملEvolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
This paper proposes a dynamic game model of the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). The model assumes that both the number of signatory countries and the stock of accumulated pollution evolve over time, as a result of countries’ emission and membership decisions. The evolution of the number of signatory countries is described by a discrete-time re...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2518349