Do tax officials use double standards in evaluating citizen-clients? A policy-capturing study among Dutch frontline tax officials

Legalize, Tax, and Deter: Optimal Enforcement Policies for Corruptible Officials∗

There is a heated debate on the merits of legalizing certain illegal, harmful and corrupting activities (such as trade in illicit drugs), but little theoretical insights on the consequences for optimal enforcement policies and corruption. We propose a model where the government hires law enforcers to report those who engage in a harmful activity. Offenders are allowed to respond by offering bri...

Why Do Sports Officials Dropout?

Sports officials’ recruitment and retention is currently an issue for many sports. The sources of stress are numerous but seem to have a reduced impact on sport officials’ dropout. To examine potential reasons of sport officiating dropout, 1718 sport officials were asked to fill a survey about their motivation, the way they trained and are evaluated, perceived stress, the qualities and skills r...

The Policy Views of Partisan Election Officials*

In the debate about partisan election administration, little attention has been focused on the views of local election officials. Election officials can be purveyors of partisanship as well as observers of the election administration environment. We use a series of national surveys of local election officials to examine the degree to which local officials of opposing parties have different poli...

Elected officials.

Addendum to Legalize, Tax, and Deter: Optimal Enforcement Policies for Corruptible Officials

1 Legalization and development: proofs In this section, we provide proofs for the statements made in section 5.2 of the paper: if the overall process of development increases parameter values x, h, v, f and decreases σ, the scope for legalization decreases. In section 3, we assume that development scales all parameters by a common factor β. In Section 3.1, we assume that the sensibility to corr...