Do Rating Agencies Confirm or Surprise the Market?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Do Rating Agencies Cater? Evidence from Rating-Based Contracts
I examine whether rating agencies are more likely to cater to borrowers with rating-based performance pricing agreements (PPrating firms). This study uses data from Moody’s Financial Metrics on agency adjustments to investigate this prediction and exploits an unexpected adverse shock to firms’ credit risk as identification. The evidence is mixed. In the crosssection and for firms experiencing a...
متن کاملDo Rating Agencies Exhibit Herding Behaviour? Evidence from Sovereign Ratings
Different rating agencies may have different levels of expertise (reputation) for different countries it is not obvious that such homogeneity holds. We therefore conduct poolability tests within this context to assess this assumption and find evidence of heterogeneity. This leads us to conduct country-by-country timeseries tests, allowing all slope coefficients to vary across countries, to asse...
متن کاملBarriers and restrictions on the activity of credit rating agencies of Tehran Secutities (in order to develop the capital market)
Abstract Credit ratings reflect the publisher's ability and willingness to fulfill its financial obligations fully and in a timely manner, leading to increased confidence in listed corporations (publishers). The main purpose of the plan is to identify and present the obstacles and limitation...
متن کاملRATING AGENCIES Harold Cole
For decades credit rating agencies were viewed as trusted arbiters of creditworthiness and their ratings as important tools for managing risk. The common narrative is that the value of ratings was compromised by the evolution of the industry to a form where issuers pay for ratings. In this paper we show how credit ratings have value in equilibrium and how reputation insures that, in equilibrium...
متن کاملRating agencies in the face of regulation
Massive downgrading and defaults during the 2008/2009 financial crisis have led politicians, regulators, and the popular press to conclude that the rating agencies’ business model is fundamentally flawed. The popular argument goes as follows. Issuers of securities naturally prefer higher ratings for their issues, because these reduce their cost of capital. Because the issuer pays the rating age...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Atlantic Economic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0197-4254,1573-9678
DOI: 10.1007/s11293-016-9486-6