Do public subsidies stimulate private R&D spending?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Do public subsidies stimulate private R & D spending ? ∗
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature that evaluates the effects of public R&D support on private R&D investment. We apply a matching approach to analyze the effects of public R&D support in Spanish manufacturing firms. We examine whether or not the effects are different depending on the size of the firm and the technological level of the sectors in which the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Research Policy
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0048-7333
DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2007.10.009