Do Parties Punish MPs for Voting Against the Party Line?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Voting for Ethnic Parties
The presumption in the theoretical literature on ethnic mobilization is that voting for ethnic parties is a purely expressive act, not subject to cost-benefit calculations. Models of strategic voting, meanwhile, typically make no reference to the ethnic identity of voters and parties. This article challenges the presumption that voting for ethnic parties is primarily an expressive act. It devel...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: CESifo Economic Studies
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1610-241X,1612-7501
DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifx006