Do insiders crowd out analysts?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation ?
In this paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may cause a strong crowding out of reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation. This crowding out effect constitutes costs of incentive provision that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the crowding out effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts with...
متن کاملDo Market Incentives Crowd Out Charitable Giving?
Donations and volunteerism can be conceived as market transactions with a zero explicit price. However, evidence suggests people may not view zero as just another price when it comes to pro-social behavior. Thus, while markets might be expected to increase the supply of assets available to those in need, some worry such financial incentives will crowd out altruistic giving. This paper reports l...
متن کاملDo Causes Crowd Each Other Out? Evidence From Tornado Strikes
Does charitable giving respond to new demands, and if so, does the response come at the expense of other charitable causes? To answer these questions we exploit exogenous variation in need arising from the random event of a nearby tornado. We use location fixed effects estimators and examine changes in charitable donations claimed for tax deductions in IRS data on individual income taxes by geo...
متن کاملWhat do Analysts’ Forecasts Reveal about Analysts’ ‘Other’ Information? †
Analysts often provide forecasts of one-year ahead earnings, earnings two-year ahead, as well as long-term earnings growth rates. In our attempts to understand the properties of these contemporaneous multi-period earnings forecasts, we begin by examining whether analysts’ earnings forecasts can be described using the linear information dynamics (LID). We find that LID is an appropriate descript...
متن کاملDo Brokers of Insiders Tip Other Clients?
This paper finds evidence that brokers who execute insider trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange engage in tipping and insider trading. We find that on the day when insiders buy (sell), there is a significant increase in the proportion of non-insider client buying (selling) handled by the insider’s brokerage firm. Furthermore, we find that the brokerage firm doubles the amount of its own buying ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Finance Research Letters
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1544-6123
DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2005.12.001