Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
No . 34 Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation ?
In this paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may undermine voluntary cooperation. This suggests that explicit incentives may have costly side effects that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the undermining effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without any incentives. Buyers, who are in ...
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We look at a principal–agent model in which the agent has to perform an action, the difficulty of which is better known ex interim than ex ante. We compare two contracting regimes; one with commitment to an ex ante negotiated contract, and one with an ex interim negotiated contract. The ex ante contract can not be too steep, but attempts to negotiate a steeper ex interim contract may result in ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.313028