Do Deposit Insurance Systems Promote Banking Stability?
نویسندگان
چکیده
During the global financial crisis (GFC), regulators and policymakers turned to deposit insurers, along with monetary fiscal measures, help restore market confidence promote stability. These events have focused attention on role of insurers their in banking system. Recent literature reveals that during GFC, insurance maintained stability successfully prevented customers doing ‘runs’ banks. The objective this paper is examine system’s coverage limits impact stability, context a jurisdiction’s economic institutional environment. Our model examines 61 jurisdictions Asia Europe explicit systems, covering pre- post-GFC period between 2004 2014. We also subsets investigate effects region by comparing Europe, as well subset using date establishment system understand if maturity matters. results indicate specifically levels, both positive negative find significant associations certain factors; however, there are differences models we ran. can be ascribed regional factors when was established.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Financial Studies
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2227-7072']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs9030052