Do CEO Power And Industry Type Affect The CSR Disclosure?

نویسندگان

چکیده

This study aims to determine the effect of CEO Power and industry type on CSR disclosure. The population in this are companies listed IDX during 2017-2020 period. research sample was determined by purposive sampling method. uses multiple regression analysis results show that a large or strong company has more involvement expanding reducing company's disclosures. also is not character an influence disclosure only one reports function as means delivering information, whether used for legitimate acquisitions information external internal parties.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Jurnal Reviu Akuntansi dan Keuangan

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['2615-2223', '2088-0685']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.22219/jrak.v12i1.20367