Divided Government, Strategic Substitution, and Presidential Unilateralism

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract Presidents select from a range of instruments when creating new policies through executive action. We study strategic substitution in this context and argue that presidents use less visible means unilateral Congress is likely to scrutinize presidential Using data on orders issued between 1946 2020, we report two main findings. First, analyzing presidents’ choice instruments, show are more substitute memoranda other for proclamations during periods divided government. Second, after accounting the with find issue greater numbers directives government than unified These findings provide evidence about limitations separation powers as constraint unilateralism highlight importance variety which create policies.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Political Science

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1540-5907', '0092-5853']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12821