منابع مشابه
Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management
Do analysts serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? This study examines the role analysts play in corporate governance by focusing on the effect that their scrutiny has on earnings management. Controlling for other firm characteristics, including institutional ownership, I find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. To add...
متن کاملInformation Conveyed in Announcements of Analyst Coverage*
This paper examines the security market response to the announcement of sell-side analysts' decisions to initiate coverage of a firm. We examine the market reaction to the initiation announcement and the accompanying investment recommendation, by disaggregating our sample based on existing analyst coverage at the announcement date. We find, on average, a significantly larger, positive stock pri...
متن کامل“ Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management ” on
This study investigates the effect of analyst coverage on both accrual-based and real earnings management. Regarding accrual-based earnings management, I find that firms followed by more analysts engage in less accruals management and that more experienced analysts seem to be more effective in constraining accruals management, consistent with the role of analysts as external monitors to manager...
متن کاملUncovering Expected Returns: Information in Analyst Coverage Proxies
This study demonstrates that standard analyst coverage proxies contain information about firm-level expected returns. I decompose analyst coverage proxies into abnormal and expected components using a simple characteristic-based model and show that firms with abnormally high coverage outperform firms with abnormally low coverage by approximately 80 basis points per month. Abnormal analyst cover...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
سال: 2011
ISSN: 2157-8834,0892-7626
DOI: 10.19030/jabr.v22i3.1426