Distributive Politics and Manipulative Policy in Local Election
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Distributive Politics with Primaries1
We develop a model of electoral competition in which two parties compete for votes amongst three groups of voters. Each party first internally selects one of two candidates to run in a general election. Candidates within a party share a fixed ideological platform and can promise a distribution of a unit of public spending across groups. Without primary elections, the selection process is random...
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We develop a model of electoral competition in which two parties compete for votes amongst three groups of voters. Each party first internally selects one of two candidates to run in a general election. Candidates within a party share a fixed ideological platform and can promise a distribution of a unit of public spending across groups. Without primary elections, the selection process is random...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2503-4456,2477-8060
DOI: 10.15294/ipsr.v4i2.19122