Distributed Cooperation among Cognitive Radios with Complete and Incomplete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Distributed Cooperation among Cognitive Radios with Complete and Incomplete Information
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1687-6180
DOI: 10.1155/2009/905185