Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria in two-network zero-sum games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria in two-network zero-sum games
This paper considers a class of strategic scenarios in which two networks of agents have opposing objectives with regards to the optimization of a common objective function. In the resulting zero-sum game, individual agents collaborate with neighbors in their respective network and have only partial knowledge of the state of the agents in the other network. For the case when the interaction top...
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Matching Pennies is a well-known example of a two player, zero-sum game. In this game, each of the players, the matcher and the mismatcher, flips a coin, and the payoffs are determined as follows. If the coins come up matching (i.e., both heads or both tails), then the matcher wins, so the mismatcher pays the matcher the sum of $1. If the coins do not match (i.e., one head and one tail), then t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Automatica
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0005-1098
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2013.02.062