Distance restricted manipulation in voting

We introduce the notion of Distance Restricted Manipulation, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win election when knowledge about others' is a little inaccurate. use Kendall-Tau distance model manipulators' confidence in non-manipulators' votes. To this end, we study problem two settings - one manipulators manipulating vote that succeeds irrespective perturbations (Distance Pessimistic Manipulation), and second for at least possible profile others Optimistic Manipulation). show Manipulation admits polynomial-time algorithms every scoring rule, maximin, Bucklin, simplified Bucklin voting rules single manipulator, k-approval rule any number manipulators, but becomes intractable Copelandα α∈[0,1] even manipulator. In contrast, almost all common rules, with exception plurality rule. For constant alternatives, both problems are solvable anonymous efficient