Distance Bounding with IEEE 802.15.4a: Attacks and Countermeasures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Complexity of Distance Fraud Attacks in Graph-Based Distance Bounding
Distance bounding (DB) emerged as a countermeasure to the so-called relay attack, which affects several technologies such as RFID, NFC, Bluetooth, and Ad-hoc networks. A prominent family of DB protocols are those based on graphs, which were introduced in 2010 to resist both mafia and distance frauds. The security analysis in terms of distance fraud is performed by considering an adversary that,...
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Using a distance bounding protocol, a device (the verifier) can securely obtain an upper bound on its distance to another device (the prover) [1]. A number of distance bounding protocols were proposed in recent years, which provide different performance and security guarantees. So far, several distance-bounding protocols were implemented, some using digital processing and short symbols, whereas...
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In the recent IEEE communication letter “Grouping-ProofDistance-Bounding Protocols: Keep All Your Friends Close” by Karlsson and Mitrokotsa, a protocol for grouping-proof distance-bounding (GPDB) is proposed. In this letter, we show that the proof that is generated by the proposed GBDP protocol does not actually prove anything. Furthermore, we provide a construction towards a distance-bounding ...
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In this paper we consider the problem of securely measuring distance between two nodes in a wireless sensor network. The problem of measuring distance has fundamental applications in both localization and time synchronization, and thus would be a prime candidate for subversion by hostile attackers. We give a brief overview and history of protocols for secure distance bounding. We also give the ...
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The communication between an honest prover and an honest verifier can be intercepted by a malicious man-in-the-middle (MiM), without the legitimate interlocutors noticing the intrusion. The attacker can simply relay messages from one party to another, eventually impersonating the prover to the verifier and possibly gaining the privileges of the former. This sort of simple relay attacks are prev...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1536-1276
DOI: 10.1109/twc.2011.020111.101219