Dispositional Sources of Managerial Discretion: CEO Ideology, CEO Personality, and Firm Strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Administrative Science Quarterly
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0001-8392,1930-3815
DOI: 10.1177/0001839218793128