Discouragement effect and intermediate prizes in multi-stage contests: Evidence from Davis Cup
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Economic Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.06.001