منابع مشابه
Discounted Stochastic Games
We give an alternative proof to a result of Mertens and Parthasarathy, stating that every n-player discounted stochastic game with general setup, and with a norm-continuous transition, has a subgame perfect equilibrium. † Institute of Mathematics and Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel. e-mail: [email protected] ...
متن کاملComputing Stackelberg Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
Stackelberg games increasingly influence security policies deployed in real-world settings. Much of the work to date focuses on devising a fixed randomized strategy for the defender, accounting for an attacker who optimally responds to it. In practice, defense policies are often subject to constraints and vary over time, allowing an attacker to infer characteristics of future policies based on ...
متن کاملDiscounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers
This paper studies discounted stochastic games with perfect or imperfect public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary transfers. We show that for all discount factors every public perfect equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a simple class of equilibria that have a stationary structure on the equilibrium path and optimal penal codes with a stick and carrot structure...
متن کاملDiscounted stochastic games poorly approximate undiscounted ones
The purpose of this note is to summarize recent results [6, 4, 5] on stochastic games by the author and his collaborators. These results have appeared or will appear in proceedings of computer science conferences. The intended reader of this note has an interest in finite stochastic games, but no particular interest in computation, that is, the computational aspects of the results obtained have...
متن کاملDiscounted Supermodular Stochastic Games: Theory and Applications
This paper considers a general class of discounted Markov stochastic games characterized by multidimensional state and action spaces with an order structure, and one-period rewards and state transitions satisfying some complementarity and monotonicity conditions. Existence of pure-strategy Markov (Markov-stationary) equilibria for the nite (in nite) horizon game, with nondecreasing and possib...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.23.4.1010