DIRECTOR REPUTATION, CEO/BOARD POWER, AND THE DYNAMICS OF BOARD INTERLOCKS.
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Board Interlocks and Earnings Quality
We show that board interlocked firms' accounting practices as reflected in earnings quality are significantly correlated, and more so for audit committee interlocks. We also show that these associations arise after interlock formation and cease after interlock dissolution, consistent with the notion that information about accounting practices transfers between interlocked firms. It has been sai...
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امروزه سالیتون ها بعنوان امواج جایگزیده ای که تحت شرایط خاص بدون تغییر شکل در محیط منتشر می-شوند، زمینه مطالعات گسترده ای در حوزه اپتیک غیرخطی هستند. در این راستا توجه به پدیده پراش گسسته، که بعنوان عامل پهن شدگی باریکه نوری در آرایه ای از موجبرهای جفت شده، ظاهر می گردد، ضروری است، زیرا سالیتون های گسسته از خنثی شدن پراش گسسته در این سیستم ها بوسیله عوامل غیرخطی بوجود می آیند. گسستگی سیستم عامل...
, CEO - Board Power , and the Dynamics
Both authors contributed equally to the paper. We are grateful to Jerry Davis, Ranjay Gulati, Paul Hirsch, Willie Ocasio. Toby Stuart, Brian Uzzi, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, the Harvard Business School, and UCLA for comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. The paper has also benefited from the helpful comments of Mark Mizruchi and the anonymous re...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Academy of Management Proceedings
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0065-0668,2151-6561
DOI: 10.5465/ambpp.1996.4980568