Direct Evolutionary Search for Nash Equilibria Detection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Direct Evolutionary Search for Nash Equilibria Detection
A Direct method of computing mixed form Nash equilibria of a normal form game by using a simple evolutionary algorithm is proposed. The Direct Evolutionary Search algorithm (DES) uses a generative relation for Nash equilibria with binary tournament selection and uniform mutation. Numerical experiments are used to illustrate the efficiency of the method.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Computers Communications & Control
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1841-9836,1841-9836
DOI: 10.15837/ijccc.2016.4.1543