Different visions of stewardship: understanding interactions between large investment managers and activist shareholders

نویسندگان

چکیده

Weak incentives to invest in shareholder oversight and limited resources confine stewardship by large institutional investors. According an influential argument, activist shareholders can offer a solution supplying investment (asset) managers with company-specific information. This article questions the potential informational role of traditional campaigns initiated hedge funds – most prominent group for purposes investors showing that these two groups have different visions little scope interactions. Consistent this data from FTSE 350 companies, UK's largest listed firms, show associations between demands voting behaviour top vary based on types demand topics. Demands business operating matters receive less support. These findings important implications corporate law reform.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Corporate Law Studies

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1473-5970', '1757-8426']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2021.1991090