منابع مشابه
Difference-form Persuasion Contests
We explore the equilibrium properties of two types of “differenceform” persuasion contest functions derived in Skaperdas and Vaidya in which contestants spend resources to persuade an audience. We find that both types of functions generate interior pure strategy Nash equilibria unlike Baik and Che and Gale with characteristics different to existing literature. For one type of function, we find ...
متن کاملDifference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions
In much of the existing literature on rent-seeking games, the outcome of the contest is either infinitely sensitive or relatively insensitive to contestants’ efforts. The current paper presents a family of contest games that permit characterization of equilibrium for all levels of sensitivity of the outcome to contestants’ efforts. Specifically, the outcome of the contest depends on the differe...
متن کاملNegotiation as a form of persuasion: arguments in first offers.
In this article we examined aspects of negotiation within a persuasion framework. Specifically, we investigated how the provision of arguments that justified the first offer in a negotiation affected the behavior of the parties, namely, how it influenced counteroffers and settlement prices. In a series of 4 experiments and 2 pilot studies, we demonstrated that when the generation of counterargu...
متن کاملPersuasion as a Form of Inter-Agent Negotiation
Agents in a multi-agent environment must often cooperate to achieve their objectives. In this paper an agent, B, cooperates with another agent, A, if B adopts a goal that furthers A's objectives in the environment. If agents are independent and motivated by their own interests, cooperation cannot be relied upon and it may be necessary for A to persuade B to adopt a cooperative goal. This paper ...
متن کاملDynamic Contests
Considering several main types of dynamic contests (the race, the tugof-war, elimination contests and iterated incumbency ghts) we identify a common pattern: the discouragement e¤ect. This e¤ect explains why the sum of rent-seeking e¤orts often falls considerably short of the prize that is at stake. It may cause violent conict in early rounds, but may also lead to long periods of peaceful int...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1097-3923
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12211