Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution

NeTS—FIND: Enabling Defense and Deterrence through Private Attribution

Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions A Public Good Experiment

Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three alternative channels: (a) identical preferences are common knowledge, but inequity is not pronounced e...

Residual Deterrence ∗

Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. Our theory rests on the costs of reallocating enforcement resources. In light o...

Author Attribution with CNN’s

In this report, the results from my CS224D final project are given and explained. The project was based on the application of relatively new neural network architectures, namely convolutional neural networks over word embeddings, to the task of authorship identification. The problem was posed as a classification task and models were evaluated over two datasets, a baseline of my own collection a...

Search Profiling with Partial Knowledge of Deterrence

Consider the choice of a profiling policy where decisions to search for evidence of crime may vary with observable covariates of the persons at risk of search. I pose a planning problem whose objective is to minimise the social cost of crime and search. The consequences of a search rule depend on the extent to which search deters crime. I study the planning problem when the planner has partial ...