Destroying Surplus and Buying Time in Unanimity Bargaining

One–dimensional bargaining with unanimity rule

The paper examines bargaining over a one–dimensional set of social states, with a unanimity acceptance rule. We consider a class of δ–equilibria, i.e. subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies that are free of coordination failures in the response stage. We show that along any sequence of δ–equilibria, as δ converges to one, the proposal of each player converges to the same limit. The...

Fair division in unanimity bargaining with subjective claims

In an experiment on a subjective claims problem we compare three unanimity bargaining procedures – the Demand, the Offer and the Exit variant – in terms of fairness and efficiency. To assess the fairness of the allocations obtained by these procedures, we evaluate them from a partial point of view using stakeholders’ subjective evaluations of claims as elicited in a hypothetical fairness questi...

Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition

I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding "persistent recognition” to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding "transitory recognition”. Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost i...

Negotiation Agenda Strategies for Bargaining With Buying Teams

A theoretical framework for selecting negotiation agenda strategies is developed for the common situation in which a single sales person is faced with bargaining with multi-functional buying teams. Two key strategic decisions regarding agenda setting, namely, the use of simultaneous versus sequential negotiation agendas, and the order of importance in which multiple issues should be bargained i...

Destroying Civilization, Destroying Nature