Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Unforeseen Contingencies ∗
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The University of Chicago Law Review
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0041-9494
DOI: 10.2307/1600635