Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty

International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty : Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help ?

Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements

use su We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdupproblem associatedwith their investments; however,most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate. If investments are noncontractible, countries face aholdupproblem...

Participation under Uncertainty

This essay reviews a number of theoretical perspectives about uncertainty and participation in the present-day knowledge-based society. After discussing the on-going reconfigurations of science, technology and society, we examine how appropriate for policy studies are various theories of social complexity. Post-normal science is such an example of a complexity-motivated approach, which justifie...

International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems

We study coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an IEA for environmental issues in the Coalitional Bargaining Game (CBG) of Gomes (2005, Econometrica). For the general CBG, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for immediate formation of the grand coalition. We apply the CBG to a river sharing problem with two symmetric upstream agents and one downstream agent....

Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements

This paper proposes a dynamic game model of the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). The model assumes that both the number of signatory countries and the stock of accumulated pollution evolve over time, as a result of countries’ emission and membership decisions. The evolution of the number of signatory countries is described by a discrete-time re...