Designing Information Provision Experiments

نویسندگان

چکیده

Information provision experiments allow researchers to test economic theories and answer policy-relevant questions by varying the information set available respondents. We survey emerging literature using in economics discuss applications macroeconomics, finance, political economy, public economics, labor health economics. also design considerations provide best-practice recommendations on how (i) measure beliefs; (ii) intervention; (iii) belief updating; (iv) deal with potential confounds, such as experimenter demand effects; (v) recruit respondents online panels. finally typical effect sizes sample size recommendations.(JEL C90, D83, D91)

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Literature

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['2328-8175', '0022-0515', '1547-1101']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20211658