Design of tuberculosis vaccine trials under financial constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Supply Chain Contract Design Under Financial Constraints and Bankruptcy Costs
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Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccines are widely used, even though estimates of efficacy have ranged from zero to 80%. BCG is a relatively safe vaccine, but it can cause disseminated infection, especially in immunocompromised hosts. Thus, the development of a more reliably efficacious and safer vaccine is important to the control of tuberculosis. The testing of any new vaccine in human populat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Expert Review of Vaccines
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1476-0584,1744-8395
DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2016.1178067