Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition

Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation in a Monetary Economy: a General Equilibrium Exposition

Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance

The subject of government bank regulation is intimately intertwined with that of government deposit insurance. If the government is to insure bank deposits, it should also have some say in the risks that insured banks are allowed to take, otherwise it would leave itself wide open to unlimited potential losses. John H. Kareken (in this issue) comes close to arguing that banks without government ...

EXPLAINING BANK FAILURES : DEPOSIT INSURANCE , REGULATION AND EFFiCIENCY

This paper uses micro-level historical data to examine the causes of bank failure. For statecharactered Kansas banks during 19 10-28, time-to-failure is explicitly modeled using a proportional hazards framework. In addition to standard financial ratios, this study includes membership in the voluntary state deposit insurance system and measures of technical efficiency to explain bank failure. Th...

Deposit Insurance , Institutions and Bank Interest Rates

Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an explicit scheme of Deposit Insurance. This instrument aims at two main targets, contributing to systemic stability and protecting depositors. However it may also affect the interest rate spread in the banking system, which can be viewed as an indicator of market power in this financial segment. This ...

Optimal bank portfolio choice under fixed-rate deposit insurance

This paper analyzes the investment decisions of insured banks under fixed-rate deposit insurance. The model takes into account the charter value and allows banks to dynamically revise their asset portfolios. Trade-offs exist between preserving the charter and exploiting deposit insurance. The optimal bank portfolio problem is solved analytically for a constant charter value. In any audit period...