Deontic epistemic stit logic distinguishing modes of mens rea

Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of 'Mens Rea'

Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlawful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Different law systems distinguish di erent modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes between `knowingly' performing a criminal act, `recklessness', `strict liability', etc. I will show we can formalize several of these categories. The form...

The Language of Mens Rea

. J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt Law School; Ph. D. Candidate in Neuroscience, Vanderbilt University. . McKnight Land-Grant Professor & Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Executive Director of Education and Outreach, MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience. . Coauthors listed beyond the second author are listed alphabetically by last name. . Harrison Foundati...

Stit, Iit, and Deontic Logic for Action Types

Culture, Cloaked in Mens Rea

Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the mens rea or state of mind associated with a particular crime is a requirement for the successful prosecution of all criminal defendants under our system of justice. In the legal jargon, it is part of the prosecution’s prima facie case. Concomitantly, criminal defendants may successfully challenge the case against them on the ground (among others) that the pr...

Prescriptive and Descriptive Obligations in Dynamic Epistemic Deontic Logic

Normative sentences can be used to change or to describe the normative system, known as prescriptive and descriptive obligations respectively. In applications of deontic logic it is important to distinguish these two uses of normative sentences. In this paper we show how they can be distinguished and analysed in a dynamic epistemic deontic logic.