Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract
Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0932-4569
DOI: 10.1628/093245606778387366