Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies
This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performa...
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Is the variety of products supplied in markets a reflection of the diversity of consumers’ preferences? In this paper, we argue that the distribution of durable goods offered in markets tends to be compressed relative to the distribution of consumers’ underlying preferences. In particular, there are strong incentives for conformity in markets for durable goods. The reason for conformity is natu...
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High degree of interest sensitivity of durable goods is now a stylized fact in the literature of monetary policy. This literature, however, does not provide a clear and consensual explanation for the modalities of this stylized fact. In this paper, two independent empirical models are performed to shed more light on the cross-sectoral impacts of monetary policy. The results of first study indic...
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We examine whether the Coase conjecture [7, 14, 4, 10] is robust against slight ability of commitment of the monopolist not to sell the durable goods to consumers. We quantify the commitment ability in terms of the speed that the durable goods perish, while keeping the time between the o ers small. We demonstrate that the slight commitment capability makes a substantial di erence by constructin...
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A durable-goods monopolist may use quality degradation as a commitment not to lower price in the future. The introduction of damaged goods expedites lowvaluation consumers future demands, and helps the firm to mitigate the Coasian time-consistency problem. In such a case, damaged goods are more likely to be observed relative to the static setting where only the price-discrimination aspect of q...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.009