Delegated portfolio management, optimal fee contracts, and asset prices
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.05.002