Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Organization of Delegated Expertise
This paper proposes a theory of the optimal organization of expertise. We develop a Principle of Incentives for Expertise: an expert is rewarded if his recommendation is confirmed either by the facts or by other experts’ recommendations. Building on this Principle, we show that agency costs of delegated expertise exhibit diseconomies of scale. Possible organizational responses to this problem i...
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We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts in different collusion environments, and explore implications for the organization of delegated expertise. We consider a principal relying on experts to gather and report two signals about a project’s value. The principal can have a single expert gather both signals or two experts gather one signal each. We show that absent collusio...
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In this paper, we present a new proxy cryptosystem named subject-delegated decryption scheme, in which the original decryptor delegates decryption authority to multiple proxies according to different subjects. The advantage of our scheme is that the proxy authorities are tightly limited (“Tightly” Limited Authority). This means that the proxy authority can be temporarily aborted even if the val...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161109